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Abstract—Usability is arguably one of the most significant
social topics and issues within the field of cybersecurity today.
Supported by the need for confidentiality, integrity, availability
and other concerns, security features have become standard
components of the digital environment which pervade our lives
requiring use by novices and experts alike. As security features
are exposed to wider cross-sections of the society, it is imperative
that these functions are highly usable. This is especially because
poor usability in this context typically translates into inadequate
application of cybersecurity tools and functionality, thereby
ultimately limiting their effectiveness. With this goal of highly
usable security in mind, there have been a plethora of studies in
the literature focused on identifying security usability problems
and proposing guidelines and recommendations to address them.
Our paper aims to contribute to the field by consolidating a
number of existing design guidelines and defining an initial core
list for future reference. Whilst investigating this topic, we take
the opportunity to provide an up-to-date review of pertinent
cybersecurity usability issues and evaluation techniques applied
to date. We expect this research paper to be of use to researchers
and practitioners with interest in cybersecurity systems which
appreciate the human and social elements of design.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity; system usability; usable security;
guidelines and recommendations; social cybersecurity issues
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and usability have often been regarded as compet-
ing system goals [1]. In [2], the authors have even posed the
question: Is usable security an oxymoron? A classic example
of the contrasting aims of these two concepts can be seen
when dealing with passwords, one of the most commonly used
security mechanisms today. From a security perspective, long,
complex (hard to guess), unique passwords which are changed
regularly is ideal, however, from a usability viewpoint, these
requirements are often a major strain on users and in turn, a
system’s usability [3, 4]. A majority of these general security
issues are also present in the cybersecurity context, where the
emphasis is on the digital environment. The challenge faced by
the Cybersecurity Usability and comparable Human-Computer
Interaction and Security (HCISec/HCI-S) fields therefore, is
bridging that conceptual and application gap, and emphasising
the need to fuse these two concepts thereby creating usable
cybersecurity interfaces and systems. This is especially as
security features and functions become standard components
in software applications and end-user systems. Common ex-
amples of these user-facing applications and systems include,
word processing software (with tasks such as adding digital
signatures to facilitate subsequent document authentication),
document readers (which allow setting viewing, access and
printing permissions), personal devices (with activities such as
applying security pins and locks to mobile phones), personal
security firewalls and email encryption tools. All of these relate
to typical tasks in the cyberspace environment.
In this paper, we aim to recap some of the major devel-
opments in the Cybersecurity Usability and HCISec domains,
particularly as they relate to guidance and recommendations
for highly usable cybersecurity systems. As such, one of the
key contributions of this paper is its consolidation of existing
work and outline of an initial core list of general guidelines.
While we do appreciate specific guidance given in areas
such as authentication, access control, encryption, firewalls,
secure device pairing and secure interaction (e.g., [3, 5–13]),
at this stage we concentrate more on general and therefore
largely context-independent guidelines. A list focused at that
general level is necessary as it will form a central part of
future work, which amongst other things, includes assessing
the applicability (and possible targeting) of guidelines to the
ISO 27002 [14] range of security controls. We also envisage
that this list may have a broader value external to our direct
intentions, as it supplies a useful state-of-the-art review for
academics, IT professionals and system designers.
To achieve the research aim above, this paper is divided into
three sections. Section II reflects on usability as an important
social issue within cybersecurity. Here, we outline a number
of core usability problems and emphasise the need for usable
security within cyberspace. Next, Section III briefly reviews
common techniques being used to evaluate the usability of
cybersecurity interfaces and systems. This section provides
a useful resource on evaluation methods and the areas in
which they have been applied to date. In Section IV, we then
consolidate several of the main general guidelines proposed
in the literature applicable to usable cybersecurity. This pulls
together a number of key research articles and recommenda-
tions and allows us to define an initial core list. The final
section then concludes this paper and discusses avenues for
future work.
II. CYBERSECURITY AND USABILITY: WHAT ARE THE
PROBLEMS?
As mentioned in the previous section, cybersecurity and
usability often tend to be regarded as competing goals.
Within the literature, there are numerous examples where
cybersecurity systems have been criticised for poor usability.
Drawing from work in [15], there are six categories of usability
studies in the field generally. These encompass authentication,
encryption, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), device pairing,
security tools and security systems. In each of these areas,
problems have been documented which affect the usability of
cybersecurity interfaces and functionality. Apart from system
usability being a problem in itself for users (in terms of
confusion, frustration, and so on), a critical point to note is that
poor usability in a cybersecurity context typically translates
into inaccurate or inadequate configurations of security tools
and functionality (e.g., access controls, firewalls, encryption
mechanisms, routers) and/or users subverting security features
all together ([16–19]). Both of these activities are likely to have
significant negative impacts on the security state of respective
systems and associated networks. Below, we review some of
the most salient articles and problems faced to the usable
cybersecurity domain.
Authors in [16] provide one of the seminal articles on
usable security (with some focus on encryption) and introduce
several of the main issues faced by users. They expressed
that interfaces for security tend to be confusing and clumsy,
and therefore hinder, as opposed to assist users — a situation
arguably still present today as papers are still forthcoming
(e.g., [4,19,20]) targeting these and similar issues. According
to [16], this usability problem is exacerbated by a number
of properties implicit to security. These properties include:
users are unmotivated (security is usually a secondary goal),
abstraction (security is governed by underlying abstract rules,
such as security policies), lack of feedback (providing quality
feedback is difficult noting security’s complex nature), barn
door property (if a secret is left unprotected even for a short
time, there is no way to be sure that an attacker has not
reached it), and weakest link (a security chain is as strong
as its weakest link, and all users need to understand this fact
as it relates to the security of their systems).
In another research study, this time around authentication
mechanisms, the authors [3] posit that passwords provide
numerous challenges for users. In various cases for example,
users have to use and remember several passwords, interact
with multiple password policies (requirements and conditions)
and various different systems. The end result is a significant
strain on users’ limited working memories. Memorability,
user knowledge and motivation are some of the core issues
highlighted in that work that affect security aspects and their
usability. Work by [5] supplies another useful perspective on
these issues and the need for user-centred design of security
mechanisms.
Further to the problems mentioned above, task workload and
increasing complexity of cybersecurity systems has also been
cited as noteworthy hindrances to usability [21]. This is even
the case for security administrators and developers, individuals
that are likely to have undergone some level of training in
system application and use. In [22], one can see numerous of
these difficulties being discussed as researchers work towards
improving the performance of online cybersecurity analysts
through visualisation and defensible recommendations. Other
research has also expressed the perspective that users face
difficulties because of near-impossible system demands on
them and secondly, arguably, what users may deem as awk-
ward behaviour (e.g., constantly locking the computer screen
when not at one’s desk, even for short periods, and the social
implications of this action) [23].
The underlying process of systems design as it relates to
usability and security has also been discussed. In [6] for
example, the author assesses the numerous conflicts between
usability and security in design (e.g., bolting on security at
the end of design and the reality that this harms usability)
and use (e.g., security typically interrupts users from fulfilling
immediate usage goals while usability has fulfilling these goals
as its aim). Instead of concluding that systems cannot focus
on both aspects, [6] stresses that security and usability are key,
and the goal should be to consider them early on, iteratively
and in concert. Reference [24] is a more recent article that
appreciates these issues and looks again towards a user-centric
design approach to usable cybersecurity.
Research by [25] also supports the argument for usable
cybersecurity systems as he focuses on the problem of a lack
of visibility of security functionality in end-user applications.
Common failings include, security options fractured across
different menus and sub-options, security features listed as
‘advanced’ (portraying that only advanced users should ac-
cess them), and lacking visible indicators of system security
status. In [20], the author supplies another useful review of
cybersecurity usability problems faced by normal end-users.
These problems encompass abundance of technical terminol-
ogy, unclear and confusing functionality, lack of visible system
status and informative feedback, forcing uninformed security
decisions, and lack of integration of security functionality.
Within the article, the author supplies examples of each of
these problems in real-world office systems, however there
are various other works (e.g., [12,19,26,27]) that support the
general argument and exemplify usability problems in security
interfaces and systems, from firewalls and network config-
urations to authentication and encryption mechanisms. With
several of the core challenges to the usability of cybersecurity
interfaces and systems reviewed, next we consider common
methods used in the literature to evaluate these cybersecurity
interfaces and systems in terms of their usability.
III. HOW IS CYBERSECURITY USABILITY BEING
EVALUATED?
Similar to the general system usability field (e.g., [28]),
there are two major methods for evaluating the usability of
cybersecurity systems. These approaches are, user studies
and expert-based evaluations [29, 30]. In the first of these
methods, a representative sample of users is recruited to
participate in experiments to test a system’s usability. Specific
examples of user studies include laboratory-based user testing,
questionnaires, interviews, and observing users and recording
and assessing system use. Normally this can be structured
around predefined tasks of interest to persons conducting the
study.
Various examples of user studies can be found in the
cybersecurity literature. From as early as [16] for example,
laboratory-based tests have been applied to evaluate how easily
users are able to complete predefined security (in this case,
encryption-related) tasks. Work by [2] is also another source
of research that has drawn upon user testing of cybersecurity
applications. There, some of the main techniques mentioned
include observations (through one-way mirrors), mirroring the
user’s screen, questionnaires and semi-structured interviews.
In [29], the authors emphasise the importance of user obser-
vation in particular, and stress that monitoring is how most
usability problems are discovered. To attain as rich a data set
as possible, their study also utilises pre/post questionnaires to
gauge user progress and ‘think aloud’ sessions where users
are asked to commentate as they perform tasks on the system.
Semi-structured interviews are preferred in [12] for evaluation,
primarily because of the view that interviews are particularly
appropriate for investigating events that happen irregularly and
infrequently. Other recent works worthy of note that utilise and
discuss these methods include [22, 27, 31, 32].
Within the expert-based evaluation technique, usability ex-
perts assess and inspect usability aspects of a system using
their knowledge and a range of usability rules and heuristics
(rules of thumb) [28]. In this area, cognitive walkthroughs
(where evaluators step through a system looking for areas
that may negatively affect usability) and heuristic evaluations
(testing a system against a set of usability rules) are two of
the most prevalent methods [30]. Further examples of the
use of heuristic evaluations are apparent in [33] where the
authors assess a personal firewall according to HCI-S criteria,
and in [34] where the evaluation of security tool alerts is
based on preset security usability rules. A perfect example and
discourse of the cognitive walkthrough technique is supplied
in [30] as the article examines the usability of forensic
analysis cybersecurity software. Expert-based methods such
as cognitive walkthrough have also been used alongside user
studies to enhance evaluations. Work by [16] provides a
quick reference of an article that employs this method and
laboratory-based tests with the aim of drawing on the strengths
of both techniques.
With appreciation of the mixture of techniques in [16] and
possible advantages to be gained by combining evaluation
methods, we briefly compare user studies and expert-based
evaluations. One of the first points to note is that as user studies
employ potential system users (and therefore are more likely
to replicate actual user behaviour), they are typically regarded
as the ideal evaluation method [30]. Furthermore, user studies
such as observations, interviews and questionnaires provide
rich sources of data that can be analysed in detail for insight
and further guidance. The drawback with these methods how-
ever, is that they can be time-consuming and expensive [30].
Necessary tasks include finding willing participants, setting
up experiments and data gathering tools and software (may
also require purchasing software applications and systems or
renting usability labs), and finally, conducting the analysis of
the qualitative and/or quantitative data collected.
Switching focus to expert evaluation, advantages accom-
panying this technique include, (i) it uses knowledgeable
individuals with some notable level of expertise in usability,
(ii) ideally, experts will have a good understanding of the users
that the system targets and how they are likely to use the
system, and (iii) it directly allows one to focus on a list of
high-priority usability principles during system assessment
[16, 28]. Possibly the most useful way to combine the two
general techniques can be seen in [29]. In their article, the
authors highlight that expert-based techniques may be used in
the initial stages to guide system design, while user studies
might be employed later to confirm design choices and test
for usability problems which may have been overlooked.
Considering the benefits possible with this joint technique, it
will likely be a prime candidate for most future evaluations in
the Cybersecurity Usability and HCISec fields.
Having covered several of the problems faced in the us-
ability of cybersecurity systems and interfaces, and prevalent
techniques for usability evaluation, we now consider the result-
ing guidelines that have been proposed. Here we focus on the
most significant and relevant guidelines and recommendations
which arise from the literature to combat the usability issues
presented.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR USABLE CYBERSECURITY
To determine the most appropriate guidelines in line with
this research’s aims, we first searched the literature for gen-
eral recommendations proposed to improve the usability of
cybersecurity interfaces and systems. Once found, we defined
a preliminary list of guidelines for analysis. Next, we assessed
the list by comparing recommendations across the articles and
where possible we grouped very similar guidelines, renaming
groupings as appropriate. During our analysis, we also noted
reoccurring guidelines within these research works (these are
shown below in brackets using each guideline’s reference
listings). In some ways, recommendations that reoccur may be
seen as possessing stronger cases of support—we revisit this
in future work discussions in Section V. Below we present
the refined list of general guidelines drawn from the literature
based on our study and analysis.
∙ Cybersecurity usability should be considered early on —
Cybersecurity, usability and the interaction between these
concepts should be debated and assessed in the initial
stages of a system’s design and development. Bolting
on or retrofitting cybersecurity usability only at the end
of a system’s development is likely to be detrimental to
the system overall and lead to additional usability and
security issues. ([6, 35])
∙ Accommodate all types of users — Cybersecurity func-
tionality should be designed such that it is flexible and
accommodating to novice and expert users. Whilst novice
users may need assistance and step-by-step guidance at
times, expert users should be able to quickly access
required functionality via system shortcuts, hot keys and
such. In general, this guidance emphasises the need for
various ways of system interaction. ([19, 20])
∙ Give informative feedback — A key ingredient to several
of the other guidelines for usable cybersecurity below
(e.g., help, error handling and visibility of security system
state) is useful system feedback. Feedback should be
clear, informative, sufficient, not too technical and where
appropriate, give suggestions for going forward. ([19,36])
∙ Provide help, advice and documentation — When neces-
sary, users should be able to easily locate and view help
and advice manuals and system documentation for cy-
bersecurity functions. If users cannot find, and determine
how to use these features, they are likely to be avoided.
([20, 36])
∙ Error prevention, handling and recovery/Undo — Sys-
tems should be designed such that they anticipate user
errors and prevent against them. If errors do occur
however, they should be handled gracefully, be presented
in informative prompts and outline steps for recovery.
This guideline also suggests that cybersecurity interface
designs support undo and quick exit functionalities for
when users make mistakes and enter unwanted applica-
tion states. Users should be able to rely on and not feel
at a loss within the application. ([16, 19, 20, 33, 36])
∙ Allow for visibility of system state — Users should be
made aware of the current security state of the system. In
many ways this is a form of passive feedback of cyberse-
curity. Some simple examples include, the word ‘Secured’
on some encrypted or password-protected documents,
active icons when security functions are being executed
on a system, and padlocks within browsers to indicate
browsing using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/Transport
Layer Security (TLS). ([20, 33, 36])
∙ Make security functionality visible and accessible —
Similar to other application features, security should be
visible and easily accessed. Hiding cybersecurity func-
tionality within advanced or disparate parts of an interface
are likely to make the user’s task more difficult and
ultimately hamper system usability. ([20, 33])
∙ Reduce cognitive load associated with system activities
— Cybersecurity interfaces should be designed to min-
imise a user’s cognitive load whilst using the system.
Over the years, various studies on human cognition
have highlighted limitations in working memory and the
need to support users and work within their memory
and thought restrictions. This might include, automating
security actions or configurations, ease of system security
setup, and generally not placing unreasonable demands on
users’ memory. Related to cognition, there are a number
of general perception and communication aspects that
should also be considered when discussing cybersecurity.
Reference [37] provides an overview of this field and
proposes several recommendations. ([19, 38])
∙ Give guidance on what tasks users need to perform and
where necessary, provide recommendations support —
Systems need to make users aware of and where nec-
essary, supply them with guidance on the cybersecurity
tasks they need to perform. Another part of this guid-
ance is recommendations support where users are unsure
of decisions and their implications. Making individuals
aware and giving guidance relates to both user domains
i.e., systems for security experts (in [22] for example,
there is a heavy focus on recommendations and respective
justifications), and those for end-users where security is
usually a secondary goal. ([16, 36, 38])
∙ Emphasise a positive system experience and good levels
of user satisfaction — As much as is feasible, cyber-
security interfaces should aim to provide users with a
positive and satisfactory experience. This might consist
of activities such as making small interface changes to
benefit user preferences or allowing for some degree of
security interface/action customisation. ([16, 19, 33, 35])
∙ Aesthetic and minimalistic design — Although it is
accepted that some aspects of cybersecurity functional-
ity (e.g., configurations) might be somewhat complex,
especially for a novice user, designers should aim to
keep interfaces simple, reduce likelihood of information
overload, and avoid awkward interface setups. ([33])
∙ Design for learnability — Cybersecurity interfaces
should be easy to learn. In [39], learnability is thought
to be affected by familiarity and consistency amongst
other things. As it relates to cybersecurity, key aspects
which might increase usability therefore involve, the use
of metaphors (relating the real-world to system functions
to exploit familiarity) and consistent terms and dialogues
in the system (to avoid confusion). ([33])
∙ Reduce use of technical and security-specific terms and
jargon — To use security features, users have to be able
to understand what they mean. As such, designers should
use technical and security-specific terms sparingly and
where they are used, consider giving descriptions. This is
particularly useful for end-user systems and novice users.
([20])
∙ Facilitate the creation of an accurate mental model —
A mental model can be defined as a user’s internal
representation or understanding of a system and how it
works [39]. Designers should attempt to define systems
that consider a user’s mental model, and therefore fos-
ter the creation of models that accurately represent the
cybersecurity interface and functionality. ([36])
∙ Design security into all application layers — Contrary to
focusing on security only at the lower and more technical
levels of the networking stack, a useful approach might
be to design security into all of an application’s layers,
especially its upper layers. The idea behind this recom-
mendation is to make the underlying security implicit
in a user’s tasks and generally, their high-level goals.
By providing this seamlessness, the system may benefit
by being seen as more user-friendly. For this approach
to be successful, designers will need to possess a good
understanding of users’ mental models and how they
reason about the system. ([35])
∙ Design such that security does not reduce performance
— While maintaining the balance between cybersecurity
and usability, system performance is another key aspect.
Designers should utilise efficient algorithms and careful
design to ensure that security features can be efficiently
used within the software application and system. ([20])
∙ Tools are not solutions — Tools including SSL and
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) are building blocks
and not solutions to user problems by themselves. To
compliment these and other lower level tools, there is
a need for high-level building blocks that can be drawn
upon by system designers to create more user-focused
applications which incorporate usable security. ([35])
∙ Separate distinct concepts — Mixing different concepts
may lead to confusion. It may therefore be useful to
separate user values from security policies, and also secu-
rity policies from security implementation. This removes
the need for end-users to be well versed in security
mechanisms just to create respective and suitable policies.
Furthermore, automation of the policy-to-implementation
step is one action that would aid significantly in a user’s
system configuration task. ([19])
∙ Note that security management interfaces may need
additional usability considerations — In cybersecurity
management interfaces, security is no longer a secondary
goal. As such, there are a few other aspects specific to
usable cybersecurity that have proven themselves worthy
of consideration. These include, ability to assess a cyber-
security system from varying encapsulation levels, facil-
itating understanding and diagnosis of potential threats,
and encouraging management staff to respond to serious
security issues promptly [22,36]. References [40,41] are
sources for other considerations and design guidelines
(around usability and otherwise).
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we reviewed the Cybersecurity Usability and
HCISec fields particularly in terms of core problems faced,
evaluation methods to date, and lastly general guidelines
proposed. In addition to providing a topical review of key
articles within this space, this paper contributes to research
by consolidating several existing usability design guidelines
applicable to cybersecurity and defining an initial core list
for future reference. We expect this list to be of use to
researchers and practitioners with interest in designing and
creating cybersecurity systems which appreciate the human
and social aspect.
Drawing on the research review in this article, we have
identified several directions of interest for future work. One
such avenue which was hinted at earlier, involves assessing
the applicability of the guidelines listed to the general set
of security controls in ISO 27002 [14]. This ISO standard
(along with others in the ISO 27000 series) is a core point
of reference to IT/cybersecurity practitioners and therefore
evaluating and if necessary, proposing extended guidance in
the usability of these controls is an important aspect. Another
direction for future research is the further examination of the
support for and importance of specific cybersecurity usability
guidelines. This analysis would be conducted with the goal of
creating a possible evidence rating or even priority structure
for guidelines. Research by [42] is an example of work that
has a similar aim (albeit a different context) as it defines and
rates Web design and usability guidelines in terms of strength
of evidence and relative importance. The ability to draw on
these types of ratings is particularly important when balancing
cybersecurity and usability, a task that will be crucial for years
to come.
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